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Abstract 
This paper proposes an all encompassing test methodology for firewalls. It extends the life cycle model to revisit 
the major phases of the life cycle after a firewall is in service as foundations for the tests. The focus of the tests is 
to show that the firewall is, or isn’t, still fit for purpose. It also focuses on the traceability between business 
requirements through to policy, rule sets, physical design, implementation, egress and ingress testing, monitoring 
and auditing. The guidelines are provided by a Test and Evaluation Master Plan (TEMP). The methodology is 
very much process driven and in keeping with the Security Systems Engineering Capability Maturity Model (SSE-
CMM). This provides multiple advantages, including the capture of configuration errors, results are measurable 
and repeatable, assurance is developed and it can be used as a roadmap for process improvement. Sample tests 
are provided in the paper, but act merely as a guideline. It would be expected that the test and evaluation master 
plan be tailored for any specific organisation. 
Keywords 
Firewall, test, methodology, TEMP, SSE-CMM. 
INTRODUCTION 
It is not simply enough to purchase a firewall from a vendor, install, configure, test and monitor it just because it 
is considered a best practice to have a firewall. This kind of thinking could easily result in a less than effectual 
solution.  The objective of this paper is to outline an effective methodology to test the firewall from as many 
perspectives as possible. Testing the firewall goes far beyond conducting penetration tests using the tools 
hackers would use. Testing must begin with examining business rules, legislation and internal IT requirements. 
These must be translated into constraints in the form of policy documentation. It should hardly be surprising that 
business rules change regularly. New business relationships are formed, internal structures are changed, business 
strategic focus shifts to new markets, technology advances and new legislation is introduced. As a result, 
policies must be regularly reviewed and updated through a formal and procedural testing process.  
Policies must be used as the inputs to the design of the network topology and the development of rule sets. 
There are various types of firewalls including application gateways, circuit gateways, packet filtering and MAC 
layer firewalls, all of which operate at different levels in the OSI model. The result is that they perform 
differently. Hybrid firewalls merge the various types of firewalls into one.  The design and implementation must 
be traceable and testable against the policy documents.  Otherwise, the resultant firewall may not meet the 
requirements and specifications in policy. Rule sets are highly integrated with the firewall topological design 
and are instrumental in functionality and must be tested as well, especially when rules are introduced or 
modified. The rule sets must be under configuration control to ensure any changes are validated and are 
traceable. 
Appropriate test plans must be written, reviewed, performed and evaluated to ensure that the firewall complies 
with policy. Test plans are driven by policy and must test the rule sets and the implementation. Firewall rule 
anomalies can be detrimental to security and performance and they must be determined and resolved through 
testing. The firewall must also be tested from an ingress and egress point of view and these tests must be 
reflected in the firewall logs. A significant component of the test plan should be the expected results. The 
firewall should behave as a predictable system. 
The resultant test report must list the tools used as well as the results. The results of the test can then used to 
modify policy, rules and design if required. 
The entire process could be quite complex in a large network, especially where artefacts of the policy creation 
process, design decisions, purchasing assessments, test plan development and test results must be documented. 
Traceability of these artefacts can be managed though the use of systems and software engineering traceability 
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software such as Telelogic Doors or IBM Rational Requisite Pro products, or a specialised database can be 
produced. This would assist in modifying policies as business rules change, and subsequently identify firewall 
rules that need to be modified and tests that need to be changed. Firewall rule datasets must be kept under 
version control and configuration control.  
Test Plan Development 
A Test and Evaluation Master Plan (TEMP) functions as a blue print for the test activities, and is comprised of 
the following activities discussed by Cole, Krutz and Conley (2005, p.55). 
 
• A detailed test plan for complete test coverage of the system under test. 
• Communicates the extent and nature of the tests. 
• Schedule of events. 
• Specification of equipment and organizational requirements. 
• Definition of the test methodology. 
• Construction of a deliverables list. 
• Determination of the expected outputs. 
• Instructions on how to carry out the tests. 
• Record of the test inputs and results. 
 
Development of the TEMP is instrumental to the effective and comprehensive testing of the firewall, and should 
be initiated during the initial design phase of the firewall. It can be updated as time evolves and should also form 
the foundation of the artefacts of the test process. It also indicates a maturity in security systems engineering of 
the organization. 
Methodology 
The Security Systems Engineering Capability Maturity Model (SSE-CMM) identifies a framework to measure 
and improve the performance of security systems engineering practices (SSE-CMM Project, 2003). Its scope 
covers the life cycle of security systems. The phases of the life cycle include concept definition, requirements 
analysis, design, development, integration, installation, operations, maintenance and decommissioning. Each of 
these phases have associated mile stones, and are usually marked by the end of test activities and/or reviews. By 
following processes and practices in a formal fashion, confidence in repeatable results should be attained. The 
SSE-CMM can be used to rate the maturity of an organization’s security engineering practices.  
Developing defined processes provides many benefits. It allows knowledge gained in previous efforts to be used 
in the future, resulting in the ability to accurately predict how much effort in time and manpower is required to 
perform similar functions. It ensures that results are repeatable and measurable.  It enhances efficiencies, and 
provides confidence that security needs are being met.  
Business requirements, legislation, business partnerships and business rules are the predominant drivers for the 
development of firewall policy. They are the constraints that limit what is passed in and out of the organisation 
through the internet. This in turn provides impetus for design changes and subsequent test activities of the 
firewall including ingress and egress testing. As the firewall enters service, it must be monitored and audited. 
Changes in business rules, threats and the development of new technologies will most likely impact policy, 
firewall rules, test procedures, monitoring and auditing. These changes may cascade through of their own 
volition, but assurance is more likely if a comprehensive test plan is followed that checks the status of each 
component. 
Figure 1 below shows the cyclical flow diagram of the six phases of the proposed firewall testing methodology. 
Each phase has associated activities of risk assessment, test and evaluation, review, reporting and version 
control. It is very similar to the life cycle phases, but the idea is to revisit these phases to ensure that the design 
is complying with legislation, business requirements, performance and security requirements. The fundamental 
idea is to determine if the firewall is still fit for purpose. It starts with checking business requirements to which 
everything should be traceable to. This would suit a desktop review, or a proactive meeting to determine short 
term and long term requirements. This is followed by testing firewall policy to ensure that it reflects 
requirements and is testable and enforceable. The rule set is then developed or re-examined. The rule set is then 
tested to ensure that it is traceable to policy and that anomalies in the rule set have not crept in. The rule set 
should be maintained under configuration control. The next step is to ensure that the design is fit for purpose as 
well. This checks that the design is appropriate, network diagrams are audited to ensure that they are technically 
sound and that the network architecture is properly reflected in the diagrams which should be under version 
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control. Implementation tests may be a monthly test to check a percentage of the physical network against the 
diagrams. This helps to ensure that the firewall is not being bypassed by rogue access points. Implementation 
also checks other physical security issues such as the location of the firewall and to confirm it is in a secure 
location, and the alarms and locks work. This is followed by ingress and egress testing to ensure that the firewall 
is functioning correctly. This is followed by ensuring that monitoring and auditing activities, which should be 
defined in policy, are being performed correctly. 
Although the TEMP provides the guidelines, schedules, procedures of the tests, the test results, reports, network 
diagrams, rule sets and authorizations should all be under version control or configuration control. They must be 
easily accessible by security staff for the purposes of audit, or in the event of a security breach where they will 
come under scrutiny. It also shows a maturity in process, and time required for test activities can be accurately 
predicted and budgeted for. 
The following sections discuss the testing of each component of the methodology in more detail. It should be 
clear that the cycle is never ending. Each section provides justifications for testing of each phase together with a 
sample checklist. It should be clear that the tests listed are suggestions only. It would be up to each organization 
to tailor their own tests to ensure that the overall design and implementation is fit for purpose as defined in 
policy. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Cyclical flow diagram of the test methodology. 
Policy Development and Testing 
Policies must accurately reflect the business needs of the organization. Business rules, partnerships, legislation, 
risk assessments and technological requirements form the constraints from which policy is developed. 
Traceability must exist between policy and these requirements to show that policy is protecting business 
functionality.  This also assists in developing assurance. “Assurance is defined as the measure of confidence that 
the security features and architecture of an information system accurately mediate and enforce an organization’s 
information system security policy” (Cole et.al., 2005, p.591).  
Steps recommended by NIST to develop firewall policy (2002, p33) include: 
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• Identify necessary network applications – These are the applications required to meet business rules 
and partnerships. It could include having a mail server, web services, and a virtual private network. 
These are all necessary for the business to operate. 
• Identify any vulnerability associated with the applications – The applications could have vulnerabilities 
and these need to be researched. Threats need to be determined, as well as associated mitigation 
strategies.  The results of these activities must be delivered in the form of a risk analysis document. 
• Perform a cost benefit analysis of various methods that can secure the application – This assists in 
determining if the benefit of having the application outweighs the potential cost. If having the 
application is going to cost more in terms of employment of security measures than the revenue it will 
deliver, then it may not be an economically feasible operation. 
• Create an application traffic matrix which shows the protection method - The development of a firewall 
policy can be assisted by the development of an applications traffic matrix. An example of which is 
shown as table 1 below (NIST, 2002, p.33). 
• Create the firewall rule set from the application traffic matrix – A significant measure of traceability 
should be evident using the above steps in the development of the rule set. This provides assurance and 
especially that a maturity has been demonstrated by using process. 
 
Table 1 
Sample Application Traffic Matrix 
 
TCP/IP 
Application 
Service 
Location Internal Host 
Type 
Internal Host 
Security Policy 
Firewall 
Security Policy 
(Internal) 
Firewall 
Security Policy 
(External) 
HTTP Any Unix Proxy Permit Permit 
SMTP/POP 
 
Any Unix Anti Spam, 
Mail  Policy 
Permit Permit 
SSH Specified 
Locations 
Unix Remote Access 
Policy 
Permit Reject All, 
except by 
Written 
Authorization 
NetBIOS Any Windows Limit Access to 
Shares 
Permit Local 
Domain Only; 
Reject Others 
Reject 
NFS Any Unix Limit Exports Reject  Reject 
  
Testing and auditing the firewall helps to provide the assurance that is required, but it is essential that policies 
are written so that they can be implemented and are individually testable. Moyer and Schultz (n.d., p.3) discuss a 
number of issues that must be answered from the testing process, and are summarized as follows. A firewall 
must effectively implement policy, and testing to ensure that the firewall implements policy correctly is critical. 
Policies should be written such that they are testable to ensure compliance. The policy should work hand in 
glove with the network services that are required. It must be determined if the firewall and other network 
components provide adequate protection from attacks initiated from external sources. The testing process can 
help to indicate the ability of the firewall to resist attacks, and help to refine the firewall policy in an iterative 
and recursive development process. It is equally important to test the firewall from the inside too. Internal 
weaknesses may exist and these potential leakages must be identified. It is also important to determine how 
much information about the network is available from the internet. Attacks from the internet can include being 
able to map the network and determine its configuration.  
Policies and rule sets can be peer reviewed on paper, and must have associated test criteria that will have 
definitive results, with either a pass or fail. All tests, results and reports are artefacts of the test life cycle of the 
firewall and should be retained. This assists in the iterative test life cycle of the firewall as it evolves and 
changes as business requirements and technology change. The policies and rule sets should be reviewed 
regularly to ensure effectiveness.  This also assists with traceability and justifications for design and test 
decisions.  Sample policy tests that could be developed further are listed below in table 2. 
Firewall Physical Design 
Firewalls are usually either appliance type devices or software systems that run over an underlying operating 
system. Whitman and Mattord (2005, p.241) list five major processing categories of firewalls as packet filtering 
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firewalls, application gateways, circuit gateways, MAC layer firewalls and hybrids. Each different type typically 
operates at different layers in the Open System Interconnect (OSI) model. Firewalls can also offer additional 
services such as Network Address Translation (NAT), encryption functionality through a Virtual Private 
Network (VPN), Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol (DHCP) and application content filtering (NIST, 2002, 
p.4). Firewalls can be configured in a variety of network connection architectures. These include packet filtering  
 
Table 2 Policy Tests 
Test Description Date Checked By Result 
Identification of 
Network Applications 
Identification of all network applications    
Vulnerability 
Assessment 
Perform a vulnerability assessment of 
network applications    
Threat Assessment Perform a threat assessment of network 
applications 
   
Risk Assessment Perform a risk assessment of network 
applications 
   
Cost Benefit Analysis Perform a cost benefit analysis of network 
applications 
   
Application Traffic 
Matrix 
Develop an application traffic matrix    
Policy Develop firewall policy    
Peer Review of Policy Peer review of firewall policy    
 
routers, screened host firewalls, dual homed host firewalls, screened subnet firewalls (with DMZ) and SOCKS  
servers (Whitman et.al., 2005, p256-260). Firewalls can be placed within the organizations intranet to separate 
LANs, or as a bastion host to the hostile internet. 
This shows how much consideration has to go into selecting the right firewall for the right purpose at the right 
time. There are performance issues to consider, as well as operational and monitoring factors, fitness for 
purpose, operational costs, vulnerabilities, threats, business rules, and partnerships. Not only do all these factors 
have to be considered at design time, they also have to be considered during testing during its service life. 
Artefacts of the original design decisions should have been retained, and the criteria that were used for that 
phase of the life cycle should be reviewed to ensure that they still meet current and future requirements. Other 
considerations include performing a physical inspection of the network to ensure that the firewall is not being 
bypassed, and that network diagrams are up to date. Sample tests are shown in table 3 below. 
Table 3 Firewall Physical Design Tests 
Test Description Date Checked By Result 
Original Design Criteria Is the original design criteria still valid? Can any new criteria be identified?    
Network Diagrams Are the network diagrams up to date? Are the network diagrams technically 
correct? 
   
Physical Inspection Is the network configured as per the 
network diagrams? 
   
Fitness for Purpose Is the design still effective?    
Threat Assessment List threats to physical design    
Risk Assessment Assess the risks for the physical design.    
Performance 
Measurement 
Is the firewall an excessive  bottleneck to 
performance? 
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Firewall Rule Anomaly Discovery 
“Serious attention has to be given to rule relations and interactions in order to determine the proper rule ordering 
and guarantee correct security policy semantics” (Al-Shaer, Hamed , 2004, p.1). As the rule set increases, the 
addition of new rules or modification of existing rules must not conflict with the intent of policy.  Anomalies 
may be introduced if the rule set is not optimised, leading to a less than effective firewall implementation, in 
terms of both performance and security. In the worst case, it could introduce a vulnerability to the network 
resulting from a misconfiguration of the firewall rules. The rules are modified as business rules and relationships 
change, technologies are introduced and removed, administrators come and go, and best practices evolve. 
Various modelling algorithms have been developed to discover anomalies within the firewall rules. Anomaly 
classifications listed by Al-Shaer et.al., using the rule set listed in table 4, and the network diagram in figure 2, 
include the following: 
Shadowing Anomaly – A shadowed rule will never be activated because a previous rule matches the same 
packets. This may result in packets that should be denied to be permitted, or packets that should be permitted, 
denied. For example, rule 4 is shadowed by rule 3 in table 4. 
Correlation Anomaly – Rules can be correlated if one rule matches some packets from a second rule, whilst 
some packets from the second rule match some packets from the first rule. An example of this is demonstrated 
by rules one and three in table 4. Rule 1’s intention is to deny http traffic from address 140.192.37.20, and rule 
three accepts all source addresses to destination address 161.120.33.40. If the order is reversed, the traffic 
denied in rule one will be accepted.  
Generalization Anomaly – If one rule matches a preceding rule, have different actions, and if the first rule 
matches the second rule, the second rule is a generalisation of the first rule. This is demonstrated where rule 1 in 
table 4 denies http traffic from 140.192.37.20, but rule 2 would accept the traffic from the same address. 
Redundancy Anomaly – If policy will not be affected if a rule is removed, the rule is redundant. Rule 7 is 
redundant because rule 6 matches the same condition, and rule nine is redundant to rule 10. Rules 7 and 9 can 
then be removed. 
Irrelevance Anomaly – If a rule does not match a domain that is catered for by the firewall, then it is an 
irrelevant rule and can be removed to improve the firewalls performance. Rule 11 is irrelevant because the 
140.192.38.* network and the 161.120.35.* networks are not part of the domain on the inside of the firewall. 
 
Table 5 lists possible tests that could be conducted in a desktop review of the rule sets. 
 
140.192.37.0
Network
161.120.33.0
Network
Firewall Internet
 
 
Figure 2. Network architecture for the rules in table 4. 
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Table 4 Firewall filtering policy (Al-Shaer et.al., 2004, p.2) 
  
Rule 
Number 
 
Protocol 
Source 
Address 
Source 
Port 
Destination 
Address 
Destination 
Port 
 
Action 
1 tcp 140.192.37.20 any *.*.*.* 80 deny 
2 tcp 140.192.37.* any *.*.*.* 80 accept 
3 tcp *.*.*.* any 161.120.33.40 80 accept 
4 tcp 140.192.37.30 any 161.120.33.40 80 deny 
5 tcp 140.192.37.30 any *.*.*.* 21 deny 
6 tcp 140.192.37.* any *.*.*.* 21 accept 
7 tcp 140.192.37.* any 161.120.33.40 21 accept 
8 tcp *.*.*.* any *.*.*.* any deny 
9 udp 140.192.37.* any 161.120.33.40 53 accept 
10 udp *.*.*.* any 161.120.33.40 53 accept 
11 udp 140.192.38.* any 161.120.35.* any accept 
12 udp *.*.*.* any *.*.*.* any deny 
 
Table 5 
Rule Set Tests 
 
Test Description Date Checked By Result 
Peer Review Peer review of rule sets    
Traceable to Policy Check that the rules are traceable to policy    
Anomalies Check for shadowing anomalies? 
Check for correlation anomalies? 
Check for generalization anomalies? 
Check for redundancy anomalies? 
Check for irrelevance anomalies? 
   
Implementation Are the rules implemented as per the rule set 
properly? 
   
 
Implementation Testing 
Best practices recommend testing the physical security of the environment the firewall is in (NIST, 2002, p.39). 
Physical access to firewalls must be limited to only those that need access to them. They should be in secure 
areas that employ monitored alarms, are intruder resistant and protected from disasters such as fire and flood. 
Electrical supplies should be considered including the supply of an Uninterruptible Power Supply (UPS). Air 
conditioning and air filtration are environmental controls that may also be required to be tested. Table 6 below 
contains a checklist of possible inspection tests for physical security of the firewall. 
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Table 6 Physical Security Tests 
 
Test Description Date Checked By Result 
Intruder Resistant 
 
Is the facility resistant to intruders? 
Locks on doors that work? 
Floor to ceiling walls? 
   
Monitored Alarm Is there a monitored Alarm? 
Is there a motion detector? 
Is there a fire detector? 
Is there a fire control system? 
   
UPS Is there a UPS? 
How long can the UPS supply current for? 
Is there line conditioning? 
   
Air Conditioning Is the temperature of the facility below 25ºC?    
Disaster Resistant Is the facility resistant to disasters?    
 
Ingress and Egress Testing 
For the purpose of demonstration, the network topology as shown in figure 3 was configured on VMware using 
BackTrack 1.0 as the attack platform, Fedora Core 5 configured with iptables v1.3.5 as the firewall, and the 
three servers in the DMZ simulated by the honeypot software, honeyd 1.5b. The simulated internet is on a 
separate virtual LAN to the servers in the DMZ.  
The firewall is fairly simplistic for demonstration purposes and focuses on servers in the DMZ, as well as the 
internet facing firewall. The firewall was configured to masquerade the servers in the DMZ using the following 
commands: 
 
# Set Policy, drop all packets on all chains 
iptables –P INPUT DROP 
iptables –P OUTPUT DROP 
iptables –P FORWARD DROP 
 
# Drop all packets with unknown connection states, and that do not have a current connection 
iptables –A FORWARD –m state –state INVALID –j DROP 
 
# Allow packets which are from an existing connection 
iptables –A FORWARD –m state –state RELATED,ESTABLISHED –j ACCEPT 
 
# eth0 is facing the DMZ, eth1 is facing the internet 
iptables –A FORWARD –i eth0 –o eth1 –j ACCEPT 
iptables –A FORWARD –i eth0 –o eth0 –j ACCEPT 
 
 
# Setup network address translation so that the 10.0.0.0 network is hidden from the internet, and the interface  
# that is connected to the internet is eth1  
iptables –t nat –A POSTROUTING  –s 10.0.0.0/24 –o eth1 –j MASQUERADE 
 
# Use the masquerading to send the right protocol to the right address in the DMZ 
iptables –t nat –A PREROUTING –p tcp –dport 53 –j DNAT –to-destination 10.0.0.2 
iptables –t nat –A PREROUTING –p tcp –dport 80 –j DNAT –to-destination 10.0.0.3 
iptables –t nat –A PREROUTING –p tcp –dport 25 –j DNAT –to-destination 10.0.0.4 
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# Drop anything that is trying to use the private IP address 
 
10.0.0.2
10.0.0.3
10.0.0.4
Windows 2003
ISA Proxy
DNS
Redhat Linux 8.0
Apache Web Service
MySQL
Switch
Remote Attacker Internet
Windows 2003
SMTP
203.59.66.1
10.0.0.1
10.0.0.5
DMZ
Trusted Network
 
 
Figure 3. DMZ Topology 
 
iptables -t nat -A PREROUTING -i eth1 -s 10.0.0.0/8 -j DROP 
 
The Firewall Analysis Template from the OSSTM (Herzog, 2003, p.86) is an example of access control testing. 
The following lists the tests suggested by Herzog, together with commands using common tools that will realize 
his recommendations using the topology given above. An attacker could quickly locate the pseudo IP address of 
the web server as 203.59.66.1, and no doubt would consider this as a first point of attack. 
 
Fingerprinting - uses packet response to fingerprint the firewall. nmap can be used to try to determine the make 
of the firewall, as well as any services it may be running.  
 
nmap –sS –O –PI –PT 203.59.66.1 
 
The result of the scan shows that only the SMTP, DNS and HTTP only services were detected, which is a good 
result. 
 
Stealth – a SYN stealth scan through the firewall in an attempt at enumeration.  
 
nmap –sS –PI –PT 203.59.66.1 –p 80 
 
In this case, it didn’t add any new information. 
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Source port control – scan of specific common, source ports for enumeration. If the firewall allows DNS 
transfers (port 53), or FTP data (port 20) nmap’s –g option allows you to spoof the value of the source port. 
 
nmap –sF –g 53 203.59.66.1 
 
Again nothing new added. 
 
Overlap – uses overlapped fragments such as a teardrop DoS attack. 
 
This would be more effective as a DDoS attack using a tool such as Shaft or Tribal Flood Network. 
 
Fragments – determines if the firewall can handle fragmented packets. This uses nmap’s –f switch to send 
fragmented packets. Splitting up the TCP header over several packets makes it much harder for packet filters to 
detect an attack. 
 
nmap –sS –f  203.59.66.1 
 
Again, this offered no new information. 
 
SYN flood – can the firewall cope with a series of SYN packets? 
 
Require a SYN flood generator 
 
RST flag – how does the firewall respond to packets with the RST flag set? 
 
UDP – how does the firewall manage standard UDP packets?  
 
ACK – uses ACK packets for enumeration purposes. 
 
nmap –sA –O –PI –PT 203.59.66.1 
 
This determined nothing new. 
 
FIN – uses FIN packets for enumeration purposes. 
 
nmap –sF –O –PI –PT 203.59.66.1 
 
This revealed nothing new. 
 
NULL – uses null packets for enumeration purposes. 
 
nmap –sN –O –PI –PT 203.59.66.1 
 
WIN – uses win packets for enumeration purposes. 
 
nmap –sW –O –PI –PT 203.59.66.1 
 
XMAS – uses packets with all flags set for enumeration purposes. 
 
nmap –sX –O –PI –PT 203.59.66.1 
 
Sustained TCP connections – is the firewall susceptible to a denial of service attack? 
This would be more effective as a DDoS attack using a tool such as Shaft or Tribal Flood Network. 
 
Fleeting TCP connections – is the firewall susceptible to a denial of service attack? 
This would be more effective as a DDoS attack using a tool such as Shaft or Tribal Flood Network. 
 
Streaming UDP throughput -  the firewall susceptible to a denial of service attack? 
This would be more effective as a DDoS attack using a tool such as Shaft or Tribal Flood Network. 
 
ICMP responses – how does the firewall respond to different types of ICMP packets? 
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Spoof responses – can IP addresses be used to determine the access control list? 
 
nmap –S 10.0.0.1 –e eth0 203.59.66.1 
Firewall blocked ok. 
 
Protocol – can the firewall stop packets using various protocols? 
 
The results show that the firewall was effective at masquerading the true IP addresses of the servers in the DMZ. 
The list suggested by Herzog has been composed into a test template below as table 7. An additional test was 
added that was not explicitly in Herzog’s list. That is, is it possible to determine the firewall rule set? This could 
possibly be done using a tool such as firewalk. 
Table 7 OSSTM Access Control Test List 
Test Description Date Checked By Result 
Fingerprinting Determine the make of the firewall?    
Stealth Scan through the firewall?     
Source Port Control Ports open?    
Overlap Can overlap fragments pass?    
Fragments Does the firewall handle fragmented packets?    
SYN Flood Does the firewall handle a SYN flood?    
RST Flag What happens when the RST flag is set?    
UDP Are standard UDP packets handled?    
ACK Use ACK for enumeration    
FIN Use FIN for enumeration    
NULL Use NULL packets for enumeration    
WIN Use WIN packets for enumeration    
XMAS Set all flags in packet for enumeration    
Sustained TCP 
Connections 
Susceptible to a DOS via sustained TCP 
connections? 
   
Fleeting TCP 
Connections 
Susceptible to a DOS via fleeting TCP 
connections? 
   
Streaming UDP 
Throughput 
Susceptible to a DOS attack?    
ICMP Responses Try various ICMP packets    
Spoof Responses Can IP addresses be spoofed to determine the 
ACL? 
   
Protocol What happens when various protocols are 
tried? 
   
Determination of 
Rule Sets 
Can the rule set be determined by using a tool 
such as firewalk? 
   
Monitoring and Auditing 
Monitoring and auditing activities should be reflected in policy. Monitoring may be in conjunction with other 
security systems such as an Intrusion Detection System. Table 8 below shows a sample checklist for testing 
monitoring and auditing activities.  
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Table 8 Monitoring and Auditing Tests 
Test Description Date Checked By Result 
Monitoring Logging occurring correctly? Providing inputs to IDS?    
Auditing Complying with auditing policy?    
Documentation 
The results of the tests should be reported, reviewed and archived. They should be available for consultation 
prior to each test to compare previous results. The rule sets should be under configuration control, with 
authorisation required to make changes. Documents under version control should include the TEMP, policy and 
network diagrams. All documentation should be available if required by authorised personnel, especially for 
times of audit, or a security breach investigation. 
The complexity of the traceability can be managed in a requirements management tool such as Telelogic’s 
Doors, Rational’s Requisite Pro, or a customised database with a forms front end. If a business requirement is 
modified, related policy, rule sets, design, ingress and egress testing, and monitoring relationships can be 
brought to the attention of the security personnel and modified appropriately. This maintains assurance, 
improves testing response and facilitates good management. 
CONCLUSION 
The objective of this paper has been to show that there is far more to testing a firewall than just performing 
ingress and egress testing. Business rules, legislation, technology and business partnerships evolve and drive 
changes that cascade through policy, rule sets, ingress and egress testing, monitoring and auditing. A cyclical 
methodology was discussed that outlines a plan that checks that everything is traceable back through to business 
requirements. Policy should be directly traceable to business requirements, and the design of the firewall 
including rule sets and physical design should be traceable to policy. Ingress and egress tests must be traceable 
to the design and auditing and monitoring must be reflected in policy. The purpose is to ensure that the design is 
fit for purpose in a cyclical fashion that never ends. This can help to capture configuration errors, to optimise 
performance, and to be proactive in meeting business requirements. 
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